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REFLECTIONS ON THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP IN ADVANCING CAUSES OF
CITIZEN GROUPS
NADINE STROSSEN*
I. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AS A VEHICLE FOR PROMOTING
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
Like many people in my generation, who came of age in the
late 1960s, I went to law school to change the world.  The then-new
public interest law movement was flourishing, and I was especially
committed to civil liberties, the concept of full and equal rights for
everyone.  I was not interested in getting onto law review, since I
was spending all my spare time working with student organizations
that addressed various aspects of the civil liberties agenda:  the Le-
gal Aid Bureau, Prison Legal Assistance Project, Voluntary Defend-
ers, and Women’s Law Association.  Given how much time I spent
working with these organizations, I had relatively little time for
studying, so I did not expect to make the law review on grades, and
I did not enter the law review’s writing competition.
I still vividly recall when the then-President of the Harvard Law
Review called to invite me to join its staff on the basis of my grades; I
thought he was joking!  When I realized that he was serious, I de-
cided to accept the invitation, even though it meant an enormous
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.  President, American Civil Liberties
Union.  J.D. Harvard Law School, 1975; B.A. Harvard University, 1972.  This essay is
based on the talk that Professor Strossen delivered at a breakfast meeting of student
editors of the New York Law School Law Review and Harlan Scholars, to kick off Faculty
Presentation Day, March 3, 2004, and was adapted by the editors, whose work on this
essay Professor Strossen gratefully acknowldges.  All credit and responsibility for the
edits are theirs.
For excellent research and administrative work in preparing this essay, Professor
Strossen thanks the following NYLS students who have worked in her office: Jason P.
Potter, Joe Burke, Matthew D. Rench, Jennifer Amore, and Jennifer Burkavage.  The
lion’s share of both credit and responsibility for this piece’s footnotes rests with the
foregoing students, as well as the editors of the New York Law School Law Review.
The author also thanks the following individuals who provided information and
materials concerning particular textual points or footnotes: Misty Buswell, Linda C.
O’Donnell, and Catherine O’Sullivan.
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investment of time (for which, in those days, we received no aca-
demic credit at all, so this had to be done on top of the usual course
load), thus reducing the time I had available for my civil liberties-
oriented pursuits.  Despite the extremely demanding workload that
we law review editors shouldered — or, in fact, because of that heavy
workload and the associated educational and professional benefits
— I am extremely grateful that I had the opportunity to serve as a
law review editor.  To this day, that experience stands out as one of
the most important professional training opportunities in my entire
legal career.  Even the aspects of a law review editor’s work that
seem menial or technical, including such  painstakingly detail-ori-
ented tasks as cite-checking and proofreading, afford invaluable
training for the most substantive and consequential professional
work.  Such technical details can determine the security of people’s
liberty and property, and even their lives — literally.  That dramatic
point is illustrated by a particularly tragic case in the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1991.  The Court refused to review the merits of this death
penalty case because of a lawyer’s procedural error that made the
appeal untimely.  The lawyer had missed a filing deadline by three
days.1  As a result of that “technical” error in a matter of “detail,” a
man lost his last chance to have a court overturn his death sentence
on substantive legal grounds; he was executed.2
Unfortunately, this kind of case is all too common.  As studies
consistently indicate, many death row inmates are the victims of
lawyering errors — errors that are serious enough likely to make a
life-or-death difference,3  but not deemed serious enough to satisfy
the Supreme Court’s extremely narrow concept of “ineffective assis-
tance of counsel” that will warrant a new trial.4  I have learned a lot
1. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727 (1991).
2. See Peter Applebome, May 17-23: Capital Punishment; One Prisoner’s Life Ends
With the Headlines, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 4 at 2.
3. See American Civil Liberties Union, Inadequate Representation, (press release)
Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.aclu.org/DeathPenalty/DeathPenalty.cfm?
ID=9313&c=62; Richard Dieter, With Justice for Few: The Growing Crisis in Death Penalty
Representation, Death Penalty Information Center, Oct. 1995, available at: http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=544.
4.  See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19
(2002); Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  For a criticism of the trend of
allowing shoddy lawyering to pass muster, see Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 225 (2004).
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about these tragic cases from Amy Tenney, a New York Law School
alumna who was an officer of the New York Law School Law Review
and is now working at the Washington, D.C. office of Jenner &
Block, specializing in appellate death penalty work, and focusing on
issues of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Throughout her law
school career, Amy also worked in my office, where she applied and
further developed her talents in the context of both academic and
activist projects.  She periodically sends me e-mails with shocking
examples of “technical details” that defendants’ lawyers overlooked,
which could well have life-or-death consequences.  Amy has given
credit to her experiences as a Law Review member and Supervising
Editor, as well as her work in my office, for honing her own meticu-
lous attention to detail, which has already enabled her to make
noteworthy contributions to life and liberty even as a relatively nov-
ice attorney.5
Recently, Amy sent me a letter telling the story of Kevin Wig-
gins, who was sentenced to death for murder in Baltimore County,
Maryland.  As Amy recounted the case, there was no physical evi-
dence linking Mr. Wiggins to the murder.  The jury that sentenced
Mr. Wiggins to death heard evidence about the murder, but none
about his moral culpability.  The two public defenders who were
assigned to represent him never investigated his childhood and
thus never learned that as a child Mr. Wiggins suffered physical and
sexual abuse, that he eventually ran away to escape the abuse and
became homeless, and that he was borderline mentally retarded.
Had the attorneys discovered this information, Mr. Wiggins would
not have been sentenced to death, because under Maryland sen-
tencing law if one juror concludes that a death sentence is inappro-
priate, a life sentence is imposed.  After years of pro bono
representation by attorneys with Jenner & Block, in 2003 the Su-
preme Court ruled that Mr. Wiggins’s trial attorneys had provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate his back-
ground.6  Although his conviction for murder still stands, Mr. Wig-
5. Jane Tinker, Amy Tenney ‘00, In the Nation’s Capitol, A Recent Graduate’s Career
Blossoms, 23 IN BRIEF: THE MAGAZINE OF N.Y.L. SCH. 1, 126 (2003).
6. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  The Wiggins decision was only the
second occasion on which the Supreme Court found that its strict standard for satisfy-
ing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel had been satisfied.  In addition, increas-
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gins is entitled to a new sentencing hearing as a result of the
meticulous legal work of Amy Tenney and her colleagues.
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AS A VEHICLE FOR PROMOTING A
JUST SOCIETY
In addition to drilling me in invaluable detail-oriented habits,
my own experiences as a law review editor also introduced me to
legal scholarship and showed me how influential such scholarship
can be as a vehicle for promoting justice.  That realization is what
prompted me to return to legal scholarship per se after I had been
practicing law and volunteering for the ACLU for the first eight
years of my legal career (following a one-year judicial clerkship,
which entails almost exclusively scholarly work).  At that point, I
joined the faculty of New York University (NYU) Law School to
serve as Supervising Attorney of its Civil Rights Clinic.  I accepted
that position to work with law students handling human rights
cases, not to pursue any scholarly goals.  However, shortly after I
joined the NYU faculty, one of my new colleagues invited me to co-
author a law review article with him about a then-breaking issue of
constitutional law7 that was clearly headed to the Supreme Court.8
In considering his invitation, I realized that this scholarly article
could serve the same activist ends as an amicus curiae brief or legis-
lative testimony, influencing judges and policymakers.
The reason I say that this article was my first venture in legal
scholarship “per se” since my days as a law review editor is that
throughout my intervening practice of law, I had constantly been
engaged in scholarship as an integral aspect of lawyering.  That was
true both in private practice, and in the kind of law reform work
that I have done with the ACLU.  By definition, those of us engaged
in law reform are operating on the frontiers of the law, trying to
ingly strict procedural limits on habeas corpus relief are preventing many defendants
from asserting their claims in federal court.
7. James B. Jacobs & Nadine Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized
Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 595, 625-32 (1985).  The author will take this opportunity to express her eternal
gratitude, again, to NYU Law Professor James B. Jacobs, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
Professor of Constitutional Law and the Courts, and Director, Center for Research in
Crime and Justice, for having helped to launch her scholarly career; this thanks cannot
be repeated too often!
8. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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expand accepted understandings of legal rights.  To accomplish
that, we must do what all legal scholars do — thoroughly under-
stand existing precedent and use it creatively in new contexts.  Ex-
cellent scholarly articles are much like excellent briefs: they reflect
a deep familiarity with past precedents but are not hidebound by
them.  Rather, they build on precedent to provide new understand-
ings and insights — and, in the policy context, new legal rights as
well.
I am proud of compliments that Supreme Court Justices have
paid to the ACLU’s briefs, acknowledging their scholarly merits
and, accordingly, their influential nature.  Following are two such
compliments from Justices who have two different perspectives on a
number of key constitutional issues: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Antonin Scalia.
Several years ago, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was kind
enough to meet with a group of ACLU supporters in her chambers.
Earlier in her career, Justice Ginsburg had worked as an ACLU law-
yer, becoming the founding director of the ACLU’s Women’s
Rights Project in 1971.  During this meeting, she showed us a li-
brary cart adjacent to her desk that was filled with many briefs con-
cerning a single case, including multiple amici curiae briefs. One
member of the group asked Justice Ginsburg how she decided
which amici briefs to read, and whether she found any particularly
helpful.  Justice Ginsburg responded that she always promptly
turned to the ACLU’s briefs, noting that when she had worked as
an ACLU lawyer, the ACLU’s National Legal Director had drilled
her and other ACLU attorneys in the highest standards of intellec-
tual rigor and accuracy, and that she continued to see these stan-
dards fulfilled in most briefs filed on the organization’s behalf.
From the opposite end of the Court’s ideological spectrum,
Justice Antonin Scalia reportedly has paid the ACLU’s briefs a back-
handed compliment.  I have been told that he has quipped, in pub-
lic presentations, that he regularly turns to the ACLU’s briefs first
to see the strongest statement of the weakest arguments!  I have no
idea whether Justice Scalia actually made this point in so many
words, but the anecdote is consistent with a recent article surveying
the Justices’ reliance on particular amicus briefs, based on inter-
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views with seventy former Supreme Court law clerks, who served
from 1966-2001.  As that article reported:
[M]ultiple clerks from both Justice Scalia’s and Justice
Thomas’s chambers listed the ACLU as an organization
that always receives closer attention . . . .  It is . . . likely . . .
that clerks and justices use amicus briefs to prepare for
cases by seeking out the best arguments presented by the
opposing side, and that the ACLU is uniformly perceived
to be outstanding.  According to one of Justice Scalia’s
clerks, “Justice Scalia does respect the views of the ACLU;
he views himself as being intellectually honest, and likes
to consider other viewpoints.”  The suggestion that one
would be challenged by ACLU viewpoints necessarily im-
plies that they are generally thoughtful and of high
quality.9
Recent scholarly studies of the impact of amici briefs in the Su-
preme Court provide systematic confirmation of these anecdotal at-
testations to the influential nature of the ACLU’s Supreme Court
briefs, thanks to their high level of scholarship, similar to what one
would expect from an outstanding law review note or article.10  For
example, the recent survey of former Supreme Court law clerks I
just mentioned revealed that the ACLU’s briefs earned substantially
more consideration than those filed by any other institution, other
than the U.S. Solicitor General’s office,11 and that the ACLU’s
9. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?  Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae
Briefs, 20 J. L. & POL. 33, 49-50 (2004).
10. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 802 (2000) (“[T]he national offices of
both the ACLU and the AFL-CIO are widely regarded by knowledgeable Supreme
Court observers as consistently producing briefs of superior quality.”).
11. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 51.  Thirty three percent of the respondents said
that the ACLU’s briefs are “always considered more carefully than” other briefs.  The
group that was cited by the next highest percentage of respondents — 21% — was state
and local governments.  Lynch also noted:
First and foremost among [public interest groups] cited was the ACLU . . .
Clerks gave the ACLU’s amicus briefs more consideration principally on
account of their consistent superiority . . .  While a few clerks noted an
ideological preference for ACLU briefs, most clerks’ comments related to
the excellence of the staff attorneys and their ability to raise the most sali-
ent legal arguments.
Id. at 49.
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briefs are highly esteemed even in the chambers of Justices who
often disagree with ACLU positions.12
The recently published survey of Supreme Court law clerks,
commenting on amicus briefs that are especially influential, under-
scores the integral inter-relationship between scholarship and advo-
cacy in another respect, beyond its demonstration that excellent
advocacy embodies excellent scholarship.  This survey revealed that
especially influential briefs include not only those filed on behalf of
a citizen group that reflect a high level of scholarship, but also
those authored by prominent law professors.13
III. THE MUTUALLY REINFORCING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SCHOLARSHIP AND CITIZEN ADVOCACY
A. The ACLU Women’s Rights Project
Since March is Women’s History Month, it is an especially ap-
propriate occasion for reflecting upon the scholarly and activist
work of one of the two Justices I have just cited — Ruth Bader Gins-
burg.  In her historic contributions to combating gender-based dis-
crimination, she embodies the synergistic combination of
scholarship and citizenship in the service of women’s rights.  Ruth
Bader Ginsburg initially undertook her pathbreaking contributions
to gender equality as a law professor, writing scholarly works that
documented women’s inequality under the law and explored con-
stitutional theories for challenging these inequalities.14 She then
looked for an institutional base for launching a law reform cam-
paign, whereby she could implement her scholarly theories to
reshape the law.  She has stressed that a major reason why she chose
the ACLU as the institutional home for her law reform initiative is
that, throughout the ACLU’s then-half-century of existence, it had
earned a solid reputation for excellent work of high scholarly cali-
ber.15  The close inter-relationship between then-Professor Gins-
burg’s scholarly work and the ACLU’s law reform initiatives is
12. See id. at 49.  (“Clerks’ plaudits of ACLU amicus briefs were remarkably similar
across all chambers.”).
13. Id. at 52.
14. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims,
11 J. FAM. L. 347 (1971); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening
Consciousness in the Law Schools, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 480 (1971).
15. See generally 2 ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS REPORT 5 (1980).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR206.txt unknown Seq: 8 21-MAR-05 12:13
512 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
typical.  The ACLU is constantly drawing upon legal scholars to
help generate creative new ideas to advance our agenda: to secure
all fundamental freedoms for all people.
B. The ACLU’s Campaign Against Racial Profiling
Another example of a surprisingly recent and very successful
law reform campaign, which is still ongoing, is the ACLU’s Cam-
paign Against Racial Profiling.16  Awareness of racial profiling —
targeting individuals for law enforcement actions based not on what
they have done but on who they are — has now become so wide-
spread that it is hard to believe that, until several years ago, most
non-minority individuals in the United States were either com-
pletely unaware of the practice or believed that it was not happen-
ing in our country.17  Accordingly, one of the major initial goals of
the ACLU’s Campaign was to spread public awareness of the prob-
lem of racial profiling that pervades too many law enforcement ef-
forts, in order to mobilize a multi-pronged strategy for eradicating
it.  This campaign has spurred substantial reform efforts all over the
country to document and curb racial profiling.  These efforts have
led to lawsuits to vindicate those who have been the victims of racial
profiling, as well as forward-looking state and federal legislation,
and training programs and rules within law enforcement agencies.
While there is still much work to do, enormous progress has been
made, including putting in place tools to continue the effort — in
the form of both public awareness and remedial laws and policies.18
All of the ACLU’s law reform efforts in this important area —
and, hence, the resulting improvements in United States law and
practice around the country — were spurred by a major academic/
activist conference that the ACLU’s Northern California affiliate
convened in San Francisco in 1998.  Hot on the heels of Califor-
nia’s anti-affirmative action voter initiative,19 and the federal courts’
ultimate rejection of a lawsuit challenging it that the ACLU had
16. See http://www.aclu.org/RacialEquality.
17. See Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among
Young Black Men, GALLUP NEWS SERV., Dec. 9, 1999, available at  http://www.gallup.
com/poll/releases.
18. See http://www.aclu.org. Go to Issues, Racial Equality.
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, previously known as “Proposition 209.”
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spearheaded,20 my California ACLU colleagues wanted to strategize
on new approaches for galvanizing public awareness of the ongoing
racial injustice in our country, and for combating it.  After all, the
success of the anti-affirmative action movement was based on the
(mis)perception that we now have attained the proverbial “level
playing field,” so that there is no longer any need for affirmative
action.
How could civil libertarians shed a spotlight on the dramatic
differences that race still makes, all else being equal?  To brain-
storm about these issues, the ACLU of Northern California con-
vened a major conference, bringing together leading scholars in
the area of racial justice, including Harvard Law Professor Lani
Guinier, as well as leading litigators in the area, including Johnnie
Cochran.  From their discussions and writings, the seeds of the
Campaign Against Racial Profiling grew.21
As a further step in this Campaign, the ACLU also commis-
sioned a study by University of Toledo Law School Professor David
Harris, documenting the extent of one form of racial profiling,
commonly called “Driving While Black.”  Professor Harris’s widely
cited study showed that dark-skinned males are stopped for alleged
driving infractions far disproportionately to their numbers in the
general population, and also far disproportionately to their num-
bers among actual violators.22  This study, which Professor Harris
expanded into a book,23 has helped foster lawsuits and laws  de-
signed to end racial profiling.24
In short, the ACLU’s Campaign Against Racial Profiling illus-
trates the symbiotic relationship between scholarship and citizen ac-
20. Coalition for Econ. Equality v. Wilson, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 579,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18486 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
21. An ACLU Northern California Roundtable; Racism And the Criminal Justice System,
ACLU NEWS, July-Aug. 1998, at 4 (ACLU-Northern California, San Francisco, CA).
22. DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK; RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S
HIGHWAYS, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT (June 1999), available at
http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html.
23. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
(2002).
24. See http://www.utlaw.edu/faculty/Harris/harris.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2005) (“Professor Harris’s early work on profiling became the basis for the Traffic Stops
Statistics Act  . . .  This has led to new anti-profiling data collection laws in thirteen
states, [and] to pending bills in more than twenty states  . . . .”).
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tivism, with each one stimulating the other, to promote common
goals of furthering justice.
C. The Ira Glasser Racial Justice Fellowship Program
Another example of the ACLU’s harnessing of legal scholar-
ship to  stimulate law reform in the area of racial justice is a new
program, the “Ira Glasser Racial Justice Fellowship Program.”
Named after the ACLU’s longtime national Executive Director,
who retired in 2001, this program honors his tireless commitment
to racial justice by awarding fellowships to individuals who are do-
ing innovative thinking and writing about means to advance racial
justice.  The program aims to select fellows who range from lead-
ing, established scholars, to relatively young people with impressive
potential to contribute important new ideas.  The first group of Ira
Glasser Fellows was named in 2004, and it includes two law profes-
sors who have focused their scholarship on racial justice issues.
I have used women’s rights and racial justice to illustrate the
mutually reinforcing relationship between legal scholarship and ac-
tivist law reform; this relationship exists throughout all areas of law.
No matter what the area of law, there are constantly new issues
emerging, which depend on careful and creative new scholarship
for resolution.  For this reason, every semester when I put together
materials for my advanced constitutional law course, I never have
any shortage of “hot” new cases to include that are either currently
pending before the Supreme Court or wending their way there,
presenting pathbreaking issues of constitutional law.  In fact, it
never ceases to amaze me how many seemingly basic issues have
never even been addressed by the Supreme Court, let alone defini-
tively resolved, even more than two centuries after the Constitu-
tion’s adoption.  Consider, for example, all the novel issues that
have been presented by the recent political controversies that have
wound up in the courts: from the Starr investigation, to the Clinton
impeachment, to (s)election 2000.  Based on this track record, I
can confidently predict that there will always be emerging new is-
sues on which both scholars and activists can “cut their teeth,” for
the mutual benefit of each other and our larger society.
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IV. TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIETAL EVOLUTION, AND THE
CONSTANT EMERGENCE OF NEW ISSUES WHERE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE CAUSES OF CITIZEN GROUPS
One reason for the steady emergence of such new issues is new
technical developments, such as the advent of the Internet.  In the
early 1990s, before the Internet had hit the public radar screen, the
ACLU formed a “cyberliberties task force” to begin analyzing the
emerging civil liberties issues in this increasingly dominant new me-
dium.  To undertake research and planning in this new venture, we
hired a young lawyer, Ann Beeson, who had just completed a one-
year post-law school fellowship at Human Rights Watch, where she
researched human rights issues in the new cyber-context.  The
ACLU initially hired Ann for another research fellowship, and then
hired her as a full-time member of our Legal Department.  As one
of the pioneers in Internet-related legal scholarship and lawyering,
Ann quickly became a star in this increasingly important new field.
Today she is the ACLU’s Associate Legal Director, which makes her
the second-ranking attorney in the ACLU’s entire national Legal
Department, and yesterday she made her second Supreme Court
argument in a leading case about online free speech, Ashcroft v.
ACLU.25  Along with other examples I have been citing, Ann em-
bodies a creative combination of scholarship and active citizenship.
Another reason for the constant emergence of new legal issues,
which provide vehicles for legal scholarship and activism alike, is
society’s evolution.  Here too we see a symbiotic relationship.  For
example, as the law becomes more supportive of the equal rights of
certain traditionally marginalized groups, those groups become
more openly and actively engaged in society, which in turn leads to
further legal reforms to promote their rights.  A dramatic current
example is the movement for the rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgendered people.  Who would have thought, even a year
ago, that there would be such constantly proliferating legal issues
about gay marriage as we are witnessing today?26  Just as the societal
25. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).  The Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in this important case on the last day of its 2003-2004 term, vindicating the ACLU’s
position.
26. See generally Diana Richmond, The Fundamental Right to Marry, 2004-4 CAL. FAM.
L. MONTHLY 2 (2004) (detailing the feverish pace of same-sex legal marriage develop-
ments); Kara S. Suffredini & Madeline V. Findley, Essay, Speak Now: Progressive Considera-
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acceptance of LGBT individuals has progressed remarkably in the
past decade — both spurred by and reflected in landmark Supreme
Court decisions that recognize basic constitutional rights of such
individuals27 — the pressure to accord full societal recognition to
LGBT relationships, through civil marriage, has burgeoned during
this year.  All over the country, government officials and citizens are
invoking the law, challenging the law, and testing the law, in an
effort either to promote or to thwart same-sex marriages.  Again we
see many essential legal issues at stake, which never have been de-
finitively resolved, or even addressed.  Again we see a crying need
for both legal scholarship and active citizenship.
One crucial issue in the gay marriage controversy is the consti-
tutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act or “DOMA,”28
which purports to exempt any state from honoring any same-sex
marriage that was performed in another state.  Opponents of
DOMA contend that it violates the Constitution’s “Full Faith and
Credit Clause,” which ordinarily obligates states to honor contracts,
including marital contracts, from other states.29  Until the DOMA/
gay marriage controversy surfaced, there had been virtually no Su-
preme Court interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause30
and scant scholarship about it.31  Now, as activists anticipate an ulti-
mate Supreme Court ruling on DOMA’s (un)constitutionality, es-
pecially given the paucity of Supreme Court precedents, scholarly
analysis of the issues is especially important.
As this piece was going to press, yet another new constitutional
issue leapt to the forefront of the ever-expanding public debate
about the single-sex marriage issue.  On July 22, 2004, the House of
tions on the Advent of Civil Marriages for Same-Sex Couples, 45 B.C. L. REV. 595, 595-596
(2004) (“[I]t seems that everyone is weighing in on the same-sex marriage debate.”).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
28. 104 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp.
II 1997), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. II 1997)).
29. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
30. See  Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 248 (1998).
31. Compare JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.6, at
327 (5th ed. 1995) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause “is normally considered in texts
on Conflicts of Law or Choice of Law and is not analyzed here.”) with Daniel A. Crane,
The Original Understanding of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV, Section 1 and Implications for
the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 310 (1998) (“Now, suddenly,
constitutional scholars are finding something that interests them in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause . . . .”).
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Representatives approved a measure entitled the “Marriage Protec-
tion Act,” which purports to bar all federal courts, including the
U.S. Supreme Court, from adjudicating any constitutional chal-
lenge to DOMA’s exemption of any state from honoring same-sex
marriages that were contracted in another state.32  The ACLU
maintains that this law is unconstitutional, contravening core con-
stitutional principles of separation of powers, equal protection, and
due process.33 However, the Supreme Court never has decided a
case on point.  Therefore, one could not confidently predict that
the Court would concur with the ACLU’s constitutional arguments
concerning this statute.
IV. SCHOLARSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP COALESCE TO ADDRESS NOVEL
LEGAL ISSUES AND PRESERVE LIBERTY AFTER 9/11
Yet another critical area where scholarship and advocacy have
worked hand-in-hand is in tackling the range of post-9/11 issues.
There has been an overwhelming amount of both scholarship and
active citizenship on these novel legal issues, which the Supreme
Court either never resolved before, or resolved long ago, under
very different factual and legal circumstances.  For example, the
Court’s notorious Korematsu decision,34 upholding the World War II
internment of Japanese-Americans, was decided before the Court’s
landmark Equal Protection Clause ruling in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,35 and also before its modern decisions robustly enforcing
rights under the Due Process Clauses.  How will the current Court
rule on parallel issues now, in the domestic “war on terrorism,” in
light of the intervening precedents that have vigorously enforced
constitutional equality and due process rights?  It is fair to say that
these are open questions that the Court has only begun to address
this term.36
32. Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
33. See Letter from ACLU to House of Representatives, July 13, 2004, available at
http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights.
34. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Shortly before this essay was submitted for publication, during the last week of
its 2004-05 Term, the Supreme Court issued decisions in three cases that pitted claims
of individual liberty against executive power in the context of the post-9/11 “War on
Terrorism.” See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). That the prior precedents
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Supreme Court Justices realize the historic responsibility and
opportunity they have to shape, or reshape, the pertinent legal
principles in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Last year, for its
2002-2003 program, the Supreme Court Historical Society chose as
its theme, “The Constitution in War Time.”  I was invited to the
kick-off lecture in that series by University of Chicago Law Professor
Geoffrey Stone, who discussed the First Amendment in times of war
or other crises, including the current “war on terrorism.”  Although
it is unusual for Justices to attend these lectures, which are not
sponsored by the Court, there were four Justices in attendance at
Professor Stone’s presentation.  Several took notes, and all were an-
imatedly engaging in discussion with him and among themselves
afterward.  Moreover, a number of the Justices have made public
speeches in which they have noted the weighty new constitutional
issues at stake.  They have stressed that they are open-minded on
these critical issues, waiting to read the lawyers’ briefs and to re-
read the precedents, as well as to consider scholarly work such as
that of Professor Stone.37
Professor Stone has now published his scholarly work on the
issues he preliminarily discussed in his Supreme Court Historical
Society lecture in an impressive new book.38  It will be the subject of
a major conference at the University of Rutgers-Camden Law
School next year, bringing together scholars and activists to com-
ment on the book’s significance.
During its current term, the Supreme Court reviewed three
major post-9/11 cases challenging the government’s asserted power
to “detain” — i.e., imprison — both citizens and non-citizens as so-
hardly provided clear guidelines for resolving the current cases is underscored by the
fact that all three were decided by split votes, and the fact that the Justices issued a total
of ten separate opinions in these cases.  Moreover, as the text states, these Supreme
Court decisions only began the process of resolving the issues that were presented even
in these cases themselves, let alone in the many other post-9/11 cases that are wending
their way through the legal system.  The Court addressed only narrow issues, relegating
to lower courts the responsibility to formulate the details for implementing its holdings
in these cases, and also to reach their own resolutions of other, related cases.
37.  See Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Liberty, Security, and the Courts, Address
Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html; see also Breyer
Says Rights Need Guarding in Terror War, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at A10.
38. GEOFFREY R. STONE, FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004).
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called “enemy combatants” without any hearings, charges, or repre-
sentation by counsel.39  In one of these key cases the petitioner,
Jose Padilla, is represented by two NYLS graduates, Donna Newman
and Andy Patel.  Their groundbreaking briefs, discussing novel con-
stitutional issues, have been published by the New York Law School
Law Review,40 and they have generously spoken to several NYLS
audiences, including my advanced constitutional law course.  Once
again, we see the intertwining of legal scholarship and citizen activ-
ism — along with teaching and studying.
Since 9/11, the ACLU has instituted dozens of lawsuits to en-
sure that civil liberties are not unnecessarily sacrificed in the name
of national security.  These lawsuits have raised many pressing new
issues, all of which have required substantial research and scholar-
ship.  The ACLU’s national Legal Department regularly circulates
among ACLU lawyers and leaders a list of all pending and pro-
jected lawsuits specifically concerning civil liberties and terrorism.
One section of this regular memorandum is devoted to ongoing
research projects, relating to potential new lawsuits.
Following are just a few of the novel efforts that the ACLU al-
ready has undertaken post-9/11, based on significant legal scholar-
ship.  In the fall of 2003 we filed a Freedom of Information Act
request about plausible allegations that prisoners “indefinitely de-
tained” at Guantanamo Bay are being subjected to torture and a
process of “extraordinary rendition,” whereby they are turned over
to governments known to engage in torture.41
In the spring of 2004, we filed a complaint with the United
Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions on behalf of  hun-
dreds of immigrants who had been peacefully living and working in
the U.S. but were swept up in the immediate 9/11 aftermath and
39. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635; Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693, 2696 (treating specifically
the question “whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality
of Executive detention of aliens” at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base); Padilla, 124 S. Ct.
at 2715.  The Padilla Court declined to reach a decision on the ultimate issue: “We
confront two questions:  First, did Padilla properly file his habeas petition in the South-
ern District of New York; and second, did the President possess authority to detain
Padilla militarily.  We answer the threshold question in the negative and thus do not
reach the second question presented.” Id.
40. Donna Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39 (2003).
41. See http://www.aclu.org/international/international.cfm?ID=13976&c=36.
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imprisoned incommunicado for weeks or even months.42  These
“indiscriminate and haphazard” detentions were condemned by
two scathing reports by the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice itself, Glenn Fine.43 Inspector General Fine’s reports docu-
mented that these individuals had been arrested based essentially
on ethnic and religious profiling, not reasonable suspicion of actual
terrorist activity.  In fact, not a single one was even charged with any
terrorist-related crime.  The lower courts ultimately rejected the le-
gal efforts that the ACLU and other human rights groups had made
to secure information about these individuals, who were held, tried,
and deported in secret.44 After the Supreme Court declined to re-
view the case, the ACLU decided to pursue possible remedies in the
international arena.  At the very least, this innovative initiative plays
the essential role of creating a record about “America’s
Disappeared.”45
Last year, ACLU lawyers made a creative effort to persuade the
Supreme Court to review an unprecedented 2003 order by the
super-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act — or “FISA” —
appellate court, which had never previously  convened.  In a pro-
ceeding in which only the U.S. government appeared, the appellate
court overturned the lower FISA court’s rejection of the govern-
ment’s expansive interpretation of its surveillance power under the
USA-PATRIOT Act.  Since these proceedings are ex parte, with only
the government appearing, and since the government prevailed in
the appellate FISA court, there was no party to seek Supreme Court
42. See http://www.aclu.org/safeandfree/safeandfree.cfm?ID=14804&c=206.
43. GLENN A. FINE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW
OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003), available at http://www.fus.org/
irp/news/2003/06/detainees.html.  (“[W]e criticize the indiscriminate and haphazard
manner in which the labels of ‘high interest,’ ‘of interest,’ or ‘of undetermined interest’
were applied to many aliens who had no connection to terrorism.” (emphasis added));
GLENN A. FINE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND RESPONSE BY THE DEP’T
OF JUSTICE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S JUNE 2003
REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (2004), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/oig/igspecrl.htm.
44. Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D.D.C. 2002), rev’d, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
45. See ACLU REPORT, AMERICA’S DISAPPEARED: SEEKING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
FOR IMMIGRANTS DETAINED AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.
org/safeandfree/safeandfree.cfm.
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review of that decision, even though it affects the privacy and free-
dom of everyone in this country.46  ACLU lawyers devised an imagi-
native and scholarly theory for seeking standing in the Supreme
Court specifically to give the Court an opportunity to pass on these
significant constitutional issues.  Therefore, a construction of the
statute denying other parties the opportunity to seek review would
effectively prevent the Court from reviewing any decision that was
in favor of the government.  This was contrary to the apparent in-
tent of the statute to grant jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.47
Again, these ACLU’s legal filings reflected prodigious legal
scholarship.
The ACLU also brought the first constitutional challenge to
the controversial USA-PATRIOT Act, challenging the notorious sec-
tion 215 of the Act, which allows government agencies secretly to
seize any records about any of us — including such sensitive
records as library, financial, medical, and student records — merely
by alleging that the records are “sought for” a counter-terrorism
investigation.48  Our clients include individuals who are deterred
from exercising their First Amendment free speech, religious free-
dom, or free association rights for fear the government may invoke
section 215 to engage in secret surveillance of them.  Given the ex-
tent to which Muslim Americans have been targeted for post-9/11
enforcement measures, including the “indiscriminate and haphaz-
ard” detentions that the Justice Department’s Inspector General de-
nounced, Muslim individuals are deterred from participating in
religious observances at their mosques and from speaking out on
post-9/11 policy issues.
The government is seeking to defeat the constitutional chal-
lenges to section 215 through a classic “Catch-22.”  The law imposes
a gag order on anyone who turns over records about any of us to
the government, forbidding the disclosing party, on pain of crimi-
nal penalty, from telling us they have done so.  Therefore, one of
the law’s constitutional flaws, the ACLU argues, is its violation of
46. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel. Surv. Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d
611 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002), rev’d, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign
Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002), cert. denied, ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003).
47. Id.
48. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D.M.I. filed
July 30, 2003).
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due process principles.  How can you effectively challenge a viola-
tion of your freedom or privacy if you do not even have notice that
it has occurred?  The government, however, seeks to defeat not
only the due process claim, but also the underlying privacy and First
Amendment claims, by contending that the ACLU’s clients lack
standing.  Since the law prevents our clients from knowing that they
have been subject to surveillance, the government contends that
they — along with everyone else — are barred from challenging
the government’s secret surveillance powers.49
An important development in this area occurred in September
2004, a timely example of the ACLU’s scholarly brief writing at the
forefront of change.  A judge in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York ruled that 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709, as
amended by the PATRIOT ACT, violates both the First and Fourth
Amendments.  The ACLU was co-plaintiff with an anonymous in-
ternet service provider (ISP).  The case challenged a “national se-
curity letter” that, consistent with the amended statute, required
the ISP to produce customer records and barred disclosure to any
person that the FBI had sought or about whom it had obtained the
information.  The court held that the statutory provision barring
disclosure is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech that
is not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s objectives.50
Several of the ACLU’s post-9/11 lawsuits challenged the gov-
ernment’s many policies that have thrown a shroud of secrecy over
all aspects of its anti-terrorism efforts.  The first such lawsuit was
brought in New Jersey to challenge the secret incarceration of im-
migrants who had been swept up right after the terrorist attacks.51
Many were being held in New Jersey, which happens to have state
49. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, Muslim Cmty.
Ass’n of Ann Arbor V. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed Nov. 3, 2003).
50. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
51. ACLU v. County of Hudson, No. HUD-L-463-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002)(con-
demning the Administration’s “secret arrest” policy as “odious to a democracy”).  After
this state court ruling, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (“INS”)
issued a new interim rule purporting to prohibit state officials from releasing informa-
tion regarding INS detainees in their custody, and the U.S. Government argued that
this interim rule preempted the New Jersey statutory and case law that the New Jersey
Superior Court had enforced in this case.  On that preemption ground, the New Jersey
intermediate appellate court reversed the lower court’s ruling.  ACLU of N.J. v. County
of Hudson, 2002 WL 1285110 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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laws that require public disclosure of all prison inmates.  The legal
research and other work in this key challenge was done by students
and faculty members at the Constitutional Litigation Clinic at
Rutgers-Newark Law School.  Ultimately, these particular secrecy is-
sues yielded conflicting rulings by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Third and Sixth Circuits.52  The Supreme Court declined to re-
view the issue, leaving critical questions unresolved — and a fruitful
topic for future scholarly analysis.
These are just a few examples of breaking legal issues concern-
ing post-9/11 efforts to preserve both personal liberty and national
security.  But they make clear that we will never run out of ques-
tions that are interesting, important and essential for engaged citi-
zens, and which will both turn on and fuel future scholarly
research.
IV. CONCLUSION
The significant role — and responsibility — of legal scholar-
ship in shaping our post-9/11 legal and political order was stressed
in the very first public remarks by any Supreme Court Justice after
the terrorist attacks.  Speaking at NYU Law School on September
28, 2001, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman appointed
to the Supreme Court bench, said:  “Academics will help define
how to maintain a fair and a just society with a strong rule of law at
a time when many are more concerned with safety and . . . ven-
geance.”53  More recently, early in 2004, Justice Ginsburg was being
honored for her towering contributions to women’s rights at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.  After Justice Gins-
burg’s opening remarks, a member of the audience asked her if
people’s rights are endangered by the domestic war on terrorism.
In response, she stressed that “an active public” had made the dif-
ference in ensuring women’s rights.54  In other words, the success
52. Compare N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, N.J. Media Group v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003), with Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (6th Cir. 2002).
53. Linda Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: The Supreme Court; In New York Visit,
O’Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
54. Gina Holland, Ginsburg: Don’t Be Apathetic About Loss of Freedom, CAPITOL HILL
BLUE, Jan. 30, 2004, available at http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/arti-
cle_3986.shtml.
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of efforts to combat gender discrimination, such as her original le-
gal scholarship and pathbreaking litigation, ultimately depended
on citizen engagement.  As in all law reform movements, many ini-
tiatives come from the citizenry, including legislative reforms and
constitutional amendments.  Even litigation victories are only
meaningful if active citizens are aware of, and exercise, their newly
recognized rights.
Justice Ginsburg then drew an analogy between this aspect of
the women’s rights movement and the current context of post-9/11
civil liberties.  In her words:  “On important issues, like the balance
between liberty and security, if the public doesn’t care, then the
security side is going to overweigh the other.”  But that would
change, she said, “if people come forward and say we are proud to
live in the USA, a land that has been more free, and we want to
keep it that way.”55  In short, to combine the wisdom of our two
women Justices, we members of the legal profession all have a spe-
cial opportunity — and responsibility — to come forward, as both
scholars and citizens, to uphold the rule of law that has kept our
great country both safe and free.
55. Id.
